May it please this Honorable Court, Attorney Patrick A. Maizy (P79503), on behalf of Plaintiff _______, an individual, hereby replies to the Realty Defendants’ Motion for Summary Disposition, and states as follows:

1. On November 21, 2020, Plaintiff entered into a three-year lease (hereinafter “the lease”) of property at _________, owned at that time by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and/or the [REDACTED] (hereinafter “the _____”).

2. [REDACTED] was the listing agent that signed the lease, and [REDACTED] was [REDACTED]’s broker (hereinafter, collectively, “the Realty Defendants”).

3. In April of 2021, the [REDACTED] directed ____to “contact [REDACTED] with any concerns hereafter.” (see Exhibit 1, p. 70 of the Amended Complaint).

4. [REDACTED] then began to provide what amount to quasi-property management services for the _______. (see Exhibit 2, p. 281 of the Amended Complaint, wherein [REDACTED] informs Plaintiff that an individual will be arriving to replace a toilet, and another may be arriving to estimate the venting of the fan in the attic, Exhibit 3, p. 293-294 of the Amended Complaint, wherein [REDACTED] states to Plaintiff “Will try to get this taken care of ASAP… I would imagine the toilets r an emergency So will try to get someone out immediately,” and also “____will be replacing the toilet … towards the end of the week … I will firm up a date when he gets back from vacation … he had a 5 day trip planned before taking in ur job,” Exhibit 4, p. 286 of Amended Complaint, wherein [REDACTED] responds to Plaintiff with instructions on fixing a malfunctioning stove, and Exhibit 5, p. 393 of Amended Complaint, an email from [REDACTED] to Plaintiff indicating that Plaintiff was not informed of mold in the house because Plaintiff was, “going through a lot of worry and concern, we did not want to alarm you adding to your stress.” ).

5. On or around August 20, 2021, the ________ sold the property to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

6. Plaintiff brought suit, in pro per, against the ________, [REDACTED], and the Realty Defendants.

7. Plaintiff’s in pro per complaint, albeit admittedly unorthodoxly structured, alleges breach of contract, breach of statutory covenants of reasonable repair and fitness, deprivation of beneficial use & enjoyment of the rental property, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

8. On March 21, 2022, the Realty Defendants filed the Motion for Summary Disposition that underlies this Reply. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff hereby requests this Honorable Court dismiss and/or deny the Realty Defendant’s Motion for Summary Disposition based on the reasons articulated below in Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Reply to Realty Defendants’ Motion for Summary Disposition. MAIZY LAW PLLC

Maizy Law PLLC Patrick A. Maizy (P79503) Attorney for Plaintiff 135 N Old Woodward Ave., Ste. 200 Birmingham, MI 48009 ph.: (248) 388-8363 fax: (248) 928-2271 e.: patrick@maizylaw.com Dated: June 27, 2022 PLAINTIFF’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S REPLY TO REALTY DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION The Realty Defendants (hereinafter “TRD”) appear to make two main arguments in their Motion for Summary Disposition. The first argument appears to be that no duty from TRD to the Plaintiff existed. The second argument appears to be that TRD’s conduct did not reach the threshold for a prima facie claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. For the reasons stated below, the Plaintiff disagrees. First Issue: Did the Realty Defendants Owe a Duty to the Plaintiff? Plaintiff contends that TRD did in fact owe a duty to the Plaintiff, and that TRD misstate the law on p. 3 and 5 of their Motion for Summary Disposition, which contends that, “a failure in [TRD’s] management would only breach a duty owed to the _____, and would not breach any duty to the tenant…the Realty Defendants have no contractual privity with or other duty to Plaintiff. “ Contrary to TRD’s assertions, in Bailey v. Schaaf, 304 Mich.App. 324 (Mich. App. 2014), the Michigan Court of Appeals, citing Dep’t of Agriculture v. Appletree Marketing LLC, 485 Mich. 1 (2010), and Wines v. Crosby & Co., 169 Mich. 210 (1912), states that, “as for an agent, he or she is personally liable for his or her own tortious conduct, even when acting on behalf of his or her principal… the agent remains liable even though his or her principal may also be vicariously liable…. an agent is subject to liability to a third party harmed by the agent’s tortious conduct … an actor remains subject to liability although the actor acts as an agent or an employee.” See also 2 Restatement Agency, 3d, §7.01, p. 115. Additionally, in Clark v. Dalman, 379 Mich. 251 (Mich. 1967), the court held that: The general duty of a contractor to act so as not to unreasonably endanger the well-being of employees of either subcontractors of inspectors, or anyone else lawfully on the site of the project, is well settled. It is clear defendant owed such a duty to plaintiff, who was lawfully on the premises at defendant's request. Further still, in Baird v. Shipman, 132 Ill. 16, (1980), the court stated that: “it is not [the agent’s] contract with the principal which exposes him to or protects him from liability to third persons, but his common law obligation to so use that which he controls as not to injury another. That obligation neither increased nor diminished by entrance upon the duties of agency, nor can its breach be excused by a plea that his principal is chargeable. If the agent once actually undertakes and enters upon the execution of a particular work, it is his duty to use reasonable care in the manner of executing it, so as not to cause any injury to third person which may be the natural consequence of his acts.” In Gateway Erectors Division v. Lutheran General Hospital, 430 N.E.2d 20 (Ill. App. 1981), citing Annot. 20 A.L.R. 97 (1922) and the Restatement of Agency § 343 (1958), the court states that: “if a servant owes a duty to a third person because of a contract with his master there is no reason why he should not be liable for injury caused by its nonperformance,” and that “an agent who does an act otherwise a tort is not relieved from liability by the fact that he acted at the command of the principal or on account of the principal.” In Addie v. Kjaer, 51 V.I. 836 (D. V.I. 2009), the court, reciting the 2 Restatement Agency, 3d, §7.01, states that: “an agent whose conduct is tortious is subject to liability” and that “the justification for this basic rule is that a person is responsible for the legal consequences of torts committed by that person … a tort committed by an agent constitutes a wrong to the tort’s victim independently of the capacity in which the agent committed the tort.” Simply put, and as was stated in Henderson v. Cape Trading Co., 289 S.W. 332 (Mo. 1926), “in torts the relation of principal and agent does not exist; they are all wrongdoers.” Finally, and in direct opposition of TRD’s contention, in Dallas Hotel Co. v. Fox, 196 S.W. 647 (Tex. App 1917), the Texas Court of Appeals remarks that: “the liability of the agent in these cases is not affected by the fact that there is no privity of contract between himself and the person injured. His liability does not depend on privity, but upon the general duty imposed on every one to so govern his conduct as not to negligently injury another.” (emphasis added). Applied to the case at bar, it is clear that the principal-agency relationship between the [Defendant Names] and TRD does not excuse TRD from the duty of care it owes the Plaintiff, nor from liability for its tortious conduct. TRD did in fact owe a duty to the Plaintiff. Second Issue: Did the Realty Defendants Conduct Reach the Threshold for an Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress? It is well-settled that whether or not conduct reaches the standard for intentional infliction of emotional distress is a determination to be made by the trier-of-fact. In Doe v. Mills, 212 Mich. App 73 (Mich. App. 1995), the court held that: "[w]here reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability." 1 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 46, comment h, p. 77. See also Linebaugh, supra at 342-343, 497 N.W.2d 585 (whether conduct is sufficiently outrageous and extreme to render one liable for the intentional infliction of emotional distress is a matter for determination by the trier of fact). Furthermore, in Rosenberg v. Rosenberg Bros. Special Account, 134 Mich.App. 342, (Mich. App. 1984), the Michigan Court of Appeals held that: If plaintiff is able to demonstrate the allegations made in her complaint, the question of whether the allegations are sufficiently outrageous to constitute the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress should be left to the trier of fact. Therefore, under the above criteria, plaintiff's claim was not so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law as to warrant dismissal under 117.2(1). Lastly, in Fernandez v. Ferndandez, unpublished, No. 315584, the Genessee Circuit Court held: Irrespective of the lack of preservation, ample evidence supported the trial court's ruling to find defendant liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and draw every reasonable inference in the plaintiff's favor. Zaremba Equip, Inc v Harco Nat'l Ins Co, 302 Mich App 7, 17; 837 NW2d 686 (2013). If a review of the evidence reveals that reasonable minds could differ on a relevant matter, we leave the matter to the trier of fact. Mull v Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States, 196 Mich App 411, 421; 493 NW2d 447 (1992). In the case at bar, Plaintiff, with health and mobility concerns, was left without a properly working toilet (see Exhibit 3, p. 293-294 of the Amended Complaint, wherein [Agent Name] states to Plaintiff “Will try to get this taken care of ASAP… I would imagine the toilets r an emergency So will try to get someone out immediately,” and also “____ will be replacing the toilet … towards the end of the week … I will firm up a date when he gets back from vacation … he had a 5 day trip planned before taking in ur job,”), without a properly working stove and in danger of a gas leak (see Exhibit 4, p. 286 of Amended Complaint, wherein [Agent Name] responds to Plaintiff with instructions on fixing a malfunctioning stove), and was not made aware of mold in the home that TRD knew of, but was instead deceived by TRD’s claim that the contractor was there to replace a vent in the bathroom (see Exhibit 5, p. 393 of Amended Complaint, an email from [Agent Name] to Plaintiff indicating that Plaintiff was not informed of mold in the house because Plaintiff was, “going through a lot of worry and concern, we did not want to alarm you adding to your stress”). Plaintiff contends that reasonable minds can differ on the egregiousness of this conduct. As such, Plaintiff requests this Honorable court leave the issue to the trier-of-fact. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff hereby requests this Honorable Court dismiss and/or deny the Realty Defendant’s Motion for Summary Disposition based on the reasons articulated below in Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Reply to Realty Defendants’ Motion for Summary Disposition.